I need summaries of these articles that lay out the main points and arguments.
NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era
De Nevers, Renée. International Security, Volume 31, Number 4, Spring 2007, pp. 34-66
Published by The MIT Press For additional information about this article
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v031/31.4denevers.html Access Provided by Bowdoin College at 08/01/12 12:43AM GMT NATO?s International Security Role NATO?s International
Security Role in the
Terrorist Era Renée de Nevers T he North Atlantic
Treaty Organization?s ongoing engagement in missions ranging from Bosnia to
Darfur suggests that the alliance has overcome the doubts about its future that
arose after the Cold War. The war on terror that followed al-Qaida?s attacks on
the United States on September 11, 2001, would appear further to reinforce
NATO?s signiªcance. While unilateral actions by the United States and U.S. cooperation with loose coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq have garnered the bulk
of international attention, experts agree that multilateral cooperation is essential in ªghting terrorism. Moreover, several of NATO?s current activities, such
as its missions in Afghanistan and the Mediterranean, are closely linked to the
war on terror, with other NATO missions also contributing to this ªght. These
activities have led NATO?s secretary-general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, to declare
that ?more than ever, NATO is in demand, and NATO is delivering.?1
This apparent vibrancy, however, may not accurately reºect NATO?s true
condition. Although its missions have expanded dramatically since the end of
the Cold War and alliance members agree on the threat posed by terrorism,
NATO?s actual role in the multifaceted struggle against terrorists is minor. This
could have long-term implications for alliance unity.
This article investigates how the United States has worked with NATO in
prosecuting the war on terror. The U.S. government conceives of this struggle
broadly, with counterinsurgency and efforts to constrain the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as essential elements. NATO is the United
States? premier alliance, and most of Washington?s closest allies are members.
But how does NATO contribute to this war on terror? To be sure, NATO is not
simply a ?tool? of U.S. policy. The war on terror is a U.S. creation, however,
and NATO has been forced to adjust to this fact. The United States perceives
Renée de Nevers is Assistant Professor of Public Administration at the Maxwell School at Syracuse
The author wishes to thank William Banks, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Brian Taylor, Terry Terriff,
the participants in the Transatlantic Policy Consortium?s Colloquium on Security and Transatlantic
Relations, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this
1. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, ?Speech at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy,? Munich,
Germany, February 4, 2006, http:/
International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 34?66
© 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 34 NATO?s International Security Role 35 terrorism as the key national security threat it will face in the coming years.
Just as the United States is working to transform its strategies in response to
this threat, we would expect it to evaluate key alliances and security relationships with this measure.
I argue that NATO is playing a largely supportive role in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The focus of both the European ?ªght against terrorism? and the
U.S. ?war on terror? lies elsewhere, leaving NATO?s contribution to efforts to
quell terrorism somewhat tangential. NATO is conducting a defensive mission
in the Mediterranean in response to the terrorist threat, and it has adopted
strategies ranging from new technology development to consequence management to prevent or mitigate terrorist attacks. In Afghanistan the alliance has
assumed a frontline role in seeking to deny terrorist groups a foothold there,
making this NATO?s ªrst de facto combat operation ever. But many of the essential elements of the ªght against terrorism, such as intelligence sharing, occur outside NATO. Afghanistan aside, NATO members participate in offensive
efforts to respond to terrorism outside NATO through bilateral activities or
loose coalitions of the willing. There are three main reasons for NATO?s limited role: shifts in alignments and threat perceptions caused by systemic
changes, NATO?s limited military capabilities, and the nature of the ªght
The United States needs allies in its ªght against terrorism, but does it need
the alliance?2 To be sure, the United States values NATO, and indeed has been
the driving force behind efforts to expand the alliance by incorporating new
members. In addition, NATO has become more than simply a military alliance.
Glenn Snyder deªnes ?alliances? as ?formal associations of states for the use
(or nonuse) of military force, in speciªed circumstances, against states outside
their own membership.?3 NATO is far more than this. It is commonly de2. At the end of the Cold War, realist scholars predicted the alliance?s demise, and during the
1990s, realist and institutionalist scholars sought to explain NATO?s longevity. For realist approaches, see John J. Mearsheimer, ?Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,?
International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5?56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, ?The
Emerging Structure of International Politics,? International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993),
pp. 44?79. For realist discussions of NATO?s continued utility, see Charles L. Glaser, ?Why NATO
Is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe,? International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 5?50; and Robert J. Art, ?Why Western Europe Needs the United States and
NATO,? Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1?39. For institutionalist approaches, see John S. Dufªeld, ?NATO?s Functions after the Cold War,? Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. 109, No. 5 (Winter 1994?95), pp. 763?787; Robert B. McCalla, ?NATO?s Persistence after the
Cold War,? International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 445?475; and Celeste A.
Wallander, ?Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,? International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn 2000), pp. 705?735.
3. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 4. International Security 31:4 36 scribed as a political-military alliance that combines the key political function
of guiding members? foreign and security policy and providing a forum for alliance consultation with the operational function of ensuring that members
can train and develop the capabilities to cooperate militarily.4 This dual role
helps to explain why NATO has endured.5 The key issues are whether its
members continue to agree on its value and what its core tasks should be, as
well as the threat that it confronts. Moreover, if NATO?s members do not seek
to address their core security threats within the alliance, the alliance?s military
value to its members is likely to be questioned.
In the next section, I compare U.S. and NATO strategies for confronting terrorism. I then assess NATO?s contribution to the U.S. ªght against terrorism.
The following section examines factors that help to explain why NATO?s contribution to the U.S. war on terror has been relatively limited. I look at three elements: systemic changes and their consequences for NATO, alliance
capabilities, and the nature of the ªght against terrorism. Finally, I discuss the
implications of NATO?s elusive role in combating terrorism for U.S. policy and
for the alliance. Comparing Strategies for Confronting Terrorism
The U.S. government widely regards NATO as the most important institution
that the United States works with, its premier alliance. Not only do government ofªcials point out how much the alliance has done to support U.S. activi4. Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane propose that NATO has become a security management institution rather than an alliance. See Wallander and Keohane, ?Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions,? in Helga Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security
Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 21?47.
5. Relatively little theoretical research has examined NATO?s current situation. Some recent exceptions include evaluations of the alliance?s effort to adjust to shifting power relations, and of soft
balancing as an alternative to traditional balance of power behavior. See Galia Press-Barnathan,
?Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity,? Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April?June
2006), pp. 271?309; Seyom Brown, Multilateral Constraints on the Use of Force: A Reassessment
(Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006); Robert A. Pape, ?Soft Balancing against the United States,? International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 7?45;
T.V. Paul, ?Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,? International Security, Vol. 30. No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 46?71; and Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, ?Hard Times for Soft Balancing,? International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 72?108. For discussions of alliance
persistence and maintenance, see Stephen M. Walt, ?Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,? Survival,
Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 156?179; Patricia A. Weitsman, ?Intimate Enemies: The Politics of
Peacetime Alliances,? Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 156?192; and Barry Buzan
and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003). NATO?s International Security Role 37 ties against terrorists, but they also note that virtually all of NATO?s activities
today are shaped by the struggle against terrorism.6
Terrorism had emerged as a shared alliance concern by the late 1990s. Terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 led
the United States to urge NATO to address this threat more seriously. As a result, terrorism was incorporated as a factor contributing to NATO?s security
challenges in the alliance?s 1999 Strategic Concept.7 It was not, however, a core
focus of NATO policy at that time.8 Terrorism crystallized as a central threat to
alliance members only after the September 11 attacks on the United States.
NATO?s initial response to these attacks was twofold: within twenty-four
hours, it invoked article 5 of its charter, declaring that the attacks on the United
States represented an attack on all alliance members. It followed this in subsequent weeks with agreement on steps to assist the U.S.-led coalition that attacked al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001. These steps
included increasing intelligence cooperation, helping to defend states that
were participating in the Afghanistan campaign, allowing overºight rights,
and deploying naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean and NATO airborne
warning and control system (AWACS) planes to the United States.9 These actions set the precedent that the alliance?s article 5 commitment could stretch
beyond the territorial defense of member states to include defense against terrorist attacks.10
NATO also moved quickly to develop military guidelines for responding to
terrorism. At the November 2002 Prague summit, members endorsed the new
Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism as ofªcial NATO policy. The
political guidance for alliance actions emphasizes that NATO?s goal should be
to ?help deter, defend, disrupt, and protect against terrorist attacks,? including
by acting against state sponsors of terrorists. In addition, the document iden6. U.S. ofªcial, interview by author, Brussels, Belgium, June 7, 2006.
7. To be sure, NATO?s European members have long experience with terrorism. For discussions of
European responses, see Jeremy Shapiro and Bénédicte Suzan, ?The French Experience of Counter-terrorism,? Survival, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 67?98; and Esther Brimmer, ed., Transforming Homeland Security: U.S. and European Approaches (Washington, D.C.: Center for
Transatlantic Relations, 2006).
8. NATO, ?The Alliance?s Strategic Concept,? NATO summit, Washington, D.C., April 24, 1999,
9. Several alliance members also participated in the coalition. NATO, ?Brieªng: Response to
Terrorism,? Online Library, March 2005, http:/
10. ?Transatlantic Homeland Defense,? CTNSP/INSS Special Report (Washington, D.C.: Center
for Technology and National Security Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, May 2006), http:/
/www.NDU.edu/inss/press/CTNSP-INSS/spl-rpt.pdf. International Security 31:4 38 tiªes four military roles for alliance operations against terrorism: antiterrorism,
or defensive measures; consequence management in the event of an attack
against a member state; offensive counterterrorism; and military cooperation
with nonmilitary forces.11
In some ways, U.S. strategies to combat terrorism differ from NATO strategies in the goals they emphasize. The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, published in September 2006, speciªes four short-term policies to
address terrorism: preventing terrorist attacks before they occur; denying
WMD to rogue states and terrorist groups; denying terrorist groups sanctuary
or support from rogue states; and preventing terrorist groups from controlling
any nation that they could use as a base of operations.12 The strategy seeks to
ensure that the United States confronts terrorism abroad, not at home. As the
U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of March 2006 notes, ?The ªght must be
taken to the enemy.?13 Moreover, in this rubric, prevention refers to offensive
counterterrorism activities. The goal of preventing attacks before they occur is
not only to stop a planned attack, but to hunt down and capture or kill terrorists determined to attack the United States. The denial elements of the strategy
are largely focused on states that might support terrorists.
NATO?s military guidelines are more defensive and reactive than those of
the United States. NATO places greater emphasis on reducing vulnerabilities
and enhancing capabilities to respond quickly to potential attacks. In contrast,
the United States seeks to keep terrorists from striking the homeland or U.S.
interests abroad. And, whereas NATO?s military guidelines suggest that its
forces could play either lead or supportive roles in offensive operations against
terrorists, more planning is recommended before NATO-led offensive operations are undertaken, while the recommendations for support missions are
more practical. This indicates the alliance?s greater comfort and experience
with its support role.
The goals of NATO and the United States as outlined in these strategies do
overlap in important ways. For example, each recognizes the usefulness of
multilateral actions and seeks to prevent attacks before they occur. In addition,
NATO?s counterterrorism strategy shares with U.S. policy the recognition that 11. NATO, International Military Staff, ?NATO?s Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism,?
updated April 14, 2005, http:/
12. The long-term policy goal is to advance democracy as a means to quell support for terrorism.
National Security Council, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: White
House, September 2006), pp. 11?17, http:/
13. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.:
White House, March 2006), p. 8, http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf. NATO?s International Security Role 39 preventing attacks may require offensive action against terrorists or states that
support them. As NATO?s Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism
states, ?Allied nations agree that terrorists should not be allowed to base, train,
plan, stage, and execute terrorist actions, and the threat may be severe enough
to justify acting against these terrorists and those who harbor them.?14
The overlap notwithstanding, U.S. strategy documents suggest that NATO?s
deeply institutionalized, consensus-based model is not the United States? preferred approach for multilateral cooperation in the war on terror. Moreover,
NATO appears to be less central to U.S. policy and planning. Both the 2002 and
2006 NSS documents promote the formation of coalitions, both within and outside NATO, to address a range of threats.15 More critically, the 2006 NSS makes
explicit the U.S. preference for a looser form of cooperation, citing as a model
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an activity designed by the George
W. Bush administration to constrain the spread of WMD-related technology.
The 2006 NSS states as a goal ?[the] establish[ment of] results-oriented partnerships on the model of the PSI to meet new challenges and opportunities.
These partnerships emphasize international cooperation, not international
bureaucracy. They rely on voluntary adherence rather than binding treaties.
They are oriented towards action and results rather than legislation or rulemaking.?16 The 2006 NSS also states that ?existing international institutions
have a role to play, but in many cases coalitions of the willing may be able to
respond more quickly and creatively, at least in the short term.?17 Similarly, the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) highlights the distinction between
?static alliances versus dynamic partnerships? and the Pentagon?s preference
for the latter.18 Some Pentagon ofªcials insist that the apparent disdain for existing alliances is aimed not at NATO, but at bodies such as the Organization
for American States, which, for example, has resisted U.S. efforts to revise its
charter in an attempt to isolate Venezuela?s president, Hugo Chavez, to punish
his anti-U.S. stance. Although NATO?s European members are less concerned
now that the United States would use NATO as a ?toolbox? than they were immediately after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003,19 they may not be reassured
that the United States strongly supports the alliance.
14. NATO, ?NATO?s Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism.?
15. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.:
White House, September 2002), http:/
16. Bush, National Security Strategy (2006), p. 46.
17. Ibid., p. 48.
18. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 6, 2006), p. vii, http:/
19. I thank an anonymous reviewer for reinforcing this point. International Security 31:4 40 A central question for the United States and NATO is whether their aims
correspond to the nature of the terrorist threat. Both U.S. strategy and NATO?s
military concept initially focused on a particular type of terrorism: the threat
posed by al-Qaida at the time of the September 11 attacks. The threat has
evolved since then, partly in response to U.S. and allied efforts to disrupt terrorist groups and their activities. The 2006 NSS notes the changed nature of the
threat, although the framework of U.S. policy has not changed. For example,
whether terrorists need states to support their activities is no longer clear.20
Not only have individuals proven willing to fund terrorist actions, but increasingly, terrorists operate ?virtually,? without formal ties, communicating and
even training via websites and other electronic media.21 One result has been
the ?localization? of threats, as seen in the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004
and London in 2005. These attacks were carried out by homegrown terrorists
with no clear ties to al-Qaida.
NATO and U.S. strategies thus exhibit both similarities and differences in
priorities. The crucial issue is how these strategies affect cooperation between
the United States and NATO regarding terrorism. NATO?s Role in the U.S. War on Terror
In this section I assess NATO?s contribution to the U.S. war on terror in the following categories: (1) prevention and defense, (2) denial, (3) counterterrorism,
and (4) consequence management?all of which are essential to confronting
terrorism. These categories incorporate both elements of the U.S. strategy and
NATO?s political and military efforts to ªght terrorism. For each category, I
evaluate how NATO?s efforts correspond to U.S. goals, as well as to the nature
of the terrorist threat.
prevention and defense against terrorist attacks
Efforts to prevent and defend against terrorist actions fall into two main areas:
intelligence sharing and surveillance to detect preparations for an attack.
NATO has engaged in both activities, primarily through Operation Active Endeavor (OAE). It is also exploring new technologies to detect and defend
against terrorist attacks, a third preventive activity.
20. See, for example, Fareed Zakaria, ?Terrorists Don?t Need States,? Newsweek, April 5, 2004,
21. See, among others, Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America?s Pursuit of Its
Enemies since 9/11 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006); and Benjamin Wallace-Wells, ?Private Jihad: How Rita Katz Got into the Spying Business,? New Yorker, May 29, 2006, pp. 28?41. NATO?s International Security Role 41 operation active endeavor. OAE is NATO?s only article 5 operation, and
it was the ªrst substantive military action the alliance took after the September
11 attacks to address the terrorist threat.22 This activity corresponds both to
Washington?s goal of preventing terrorist attacks and to NATO?s antiterrorism
strategy. After deploying in the eastern Mediterranean in October 2001 as a
deterrent and surveillance measure in support of the U.S. intervention in
Afghanistan, OAE evolved into a broader counterterrorism initiative. It expanded to cover the entire Mediterranean in 2003; and during the U.S.
invasion of Iraq, it escorted ships through the Strait of Gibraltar (at the
United States? request) to alleviate concerns that terrorists might target such
ships. OAE has focused on monitoring shipping and the safety of ports and
narrow sea-lanes. A second goal, particularly since 2003, has been to expand
participation by non-NATO states, both by countries that are formal NATO
partners and by countries participating in NATO?s Mediterranean Dialogue, a
consultative forum intended to improve cooperation with countries in the
OAE has devoted much attention to expanding its intelligence-sharing activities, including efforts to develop a network for tracking merchant shipping
throughout the Mediterranean, and improving means to share this intelligence
with relevant governments. This should help to address not only terrorist concerns but also alliance efforts to prevent drug smuggling and the spread of
weapons of mass destruction.24
OAE has clear military objectives, and NATO has developed valuable experience in maritime surveillance and interdiction through this mission. At the
same time, the mission has had both strategic and political aims. NATO has
sought to include Russia in OAE, for example, to gain Moscow?s agreement to
extend the operation?s activities into the Black Sea. Expansion into the Black
Sea has not happened, due to objections from both Russia and Turkey to allowing NATO operations there, but Russia participated in OAE patrols in the
Mediterranean in 2006.25 Efforts to include more Mediterranean countries are
22. General James L. Jones, ?NATO: From Common Defense to Common Security,? Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong., 2d sess., February 7, 2006, http:/
23. NATO, ?NATO Elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a Genuine Partnership, Launches Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative,? NATO Update, June 29, 2004, http:/
24. Robert Cesaretti, ?Combating Terrorism in the Mediterranean,? NATO Review, No. 3 (Autumn
25. Russia was unwilling to agree to this move unless it gained a greater decisionmaking role over
the activity, which NATO was not willing to accept. Vladimir Socor, ?Russians Not Joining NATO
Operation Active Endeavor,? Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 1, No. 136 (November 30, 2004); Jones, International Security 31:4 42 designed to improve cooperation and, if possible, to share the burden for sustaining the operation with a greater number of countries. This is in keeping
with NATO?s ongoing efforts to explore expanded partnerships with countries
around the globe.26
The United States values OAE because it facilitates...
This question was answered on: Jan 30, 2021
Buy this answer for only: $15
This attachment is locked
We have a ready expert answer for this paper which you can use for in-depth understanding, research editing or paraphrasing. You can buy it or order for a fresh, original and plagiarism-free solution (Deadline assured. Flexible pricing. TurnItIn Report provided)
Pay using PayPal (No PayPal account Required) or your credit card . All your purchases are securely protected by .
About this QuestionSTATUS
Jan 30, 2021EXPERT
GET INSTANT HELP/h4>
We have top-notch tutors who can do your essay/homework for you at a reasonable cost and then you can simply use that essay as a template to build your own arguments.
You can also use these solutions:
- As a reference for in-depth understanding of the subject.
- As a source of ideas / reasoning for your own research (if properly referenced)
- For editing and paraphrasing (check your institution's definition of plagiarism and recommended paraphrase).
NEW ASSIGNMENT HELP?
Order New Solution. Quick Turnaround
Click on the button below in order to Order for a New, Original and High-Quality Essay Solutions. New orders are original solutions and precise to your writing instruction requirements. Place a New Order using the button below.
WE GUARANTEE, THAT YOUR PAPER WILL BE WRITTEN FROM SCRATCH AND WITHIN A DEADLINE.