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(solution) I need summaries of these articles that lay out the main points

I need summaries of these articles that lay out the main points and arguments. 

NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era


De Nevers, Renée. International Security, Volume 31, Number 4, Spring 2007, pp. 34-66




Published by The MIT Press For additional information about this article Access Provided by Bowdoin College at 08/01/12 12:43AM GMT NATO?s International Security Role NATO?s International


Security Role in the


Terrorist Era Renée de Nevers T he North Atlantic


Treaty Organization?s ongoing engagement in missions ranging from Bosnia to


Darfur suggests that the alliance has overcome the doubts about its future that


arose after the Cold War. The war on terror that followed al-Qaida?s attacks on


the United States on September 11, 2001, would appear further to reinforce


NATO?s signiªcance. While unilateral actions by the United States and U.S. cooperation with loose coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq have garnered the bulk


of international attention, experts agree that multilateral cooperation is essential in ªghting terrorism. Moreover, several of NATO?s current activities, such


as its missions in Afghanistan and the Mediterranean, are closely linked to the


war on terror, with other NATO missions also contributing to this ªght. These


activities have led NATO?s secretary-general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, to declare


that ?more than ever, NATO is in demand, and NATO is delivering.?1


This apparent vibrancy, however, may not accurately reºect NATO?s true


condition. Although its missions have expanded dramatically since the end of


the Cold War and alliance members agree on the threat posed by terrorism,


NATO?s actual role in the multifaceted struggle against terrorists is minor. This


could have long-term implications for alliance unity.


This article investigates how the United States has worked with NATO in


prosecuting the war on terror. The U.S. government conceives of this struggle


broadly, with counterinsurgency and efforts to constrain the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as essential elements. NATO is the United


States? premier alliance, and most of Washington?s closest allies are members.


But how does NATO contribute to this war on terror? To be sure, NATO is not


simply a ?tool? of U.S. policy. The war on terror is a U.S. creation, however,


and NATO has been forced to adjust to this fact. The United States perceives


Renée de Nevers is Assistant Professor of Public Administration at the Maxwell School at Syracuse




The author wishes to thank William Banks, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Brian Taylor, Terry Terriff,


the participants in the Transatlantic Policy Consortium?s Colloquium on Security and Transatlantic


Relations, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this




1. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, ?Speech at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy,? Munich,


Germany, February 4, 2006, http:/




International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 34?66


© 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 34 NATO?s International Security Role 35 terrorism as the key national security threat it will face in the coming years.


Just as the United States is working to transform its strategies in response to


this threat, we would expect it to evaluate key alliances and security relationships with this measure.


I argue that NATO is playing a largely supportive role in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The focus of both the European ?ªght against terrorism? and the


U.S. ?war on terror? lies elsewhere, leaving NATO?s contribution to efforts to


quell terrorism somewhat tangential. NATO is conducting a defensive mission


in the Mediterranean in response to the terrorist threat, and it has adopted


strategies ranging from new technology development to consequence management to prevent or mitigate terrorist attacks. In Afghanistan the alliance has


assumed a frontline role in seeking to deny terrorist groups a foothold there,


making this NATO?s ªrst de facto combat operation ever. But many of the essential elements of the ªght against terrorism, such as intelligence sharing, occur outside NATO. Afghanistan aside, NATO members participate in offensive


efforts to respond to terrorism outside NATO through bilateral activities or


loose coalitions of the willing. There are three main reasons for NATO?s limited role: shifts in alignments and threat perceptions caused by systemic


changes, NATO?s limited military capabilities, and the nature of the ªght


against terror.


The United States needs allies in its ªght against terrorism, but does it need


the alliance?2 To be sure, the United States values NATO, and indeed has been


the driving force behind efforts to expand the alliance by incorporating new


members. In addition, NATO has become more than simply a military alliance.


Glenn Snyder deªnes ?alliances? as ?formal associations of states for the use


(or nonuse) of military force, in speciªed circumstances, against states outside


their own membership.?3 NATO is far more than this. It is commonly de2. At the end of the Cold War, realist scholars predicted the alliance?s demise, and during the


1990s, realist and institutionalist scholars sought to explain NATO?s longevity. For realist approaches, see John J. Mearsheimer, ?Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,?


International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5?56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, ?The


Emerging Structure of International Politics,? International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993),


pp. 44?79. For realist discussions of NATO?s continued utility, see Charles L. Glaser, ?Why NATO


Is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe,? International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 5?50; and Robert J. Art, ?Why Western Europe Needs the United States and


NATO,? Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1?39. For institutionalist approaches, see John S. Dufªeld, ?NATO?s Functions after the Cold War,? Political Science Quarterly,


Vol. 109, No. 5 (Winter 1994?95), pp. 763?787; Robert B. McCalla, ?NATO?s Persistence after the


Cold War,? International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 445?475; and Celeste A.


Wallander, ?Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,? International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn 2000), pp. 705?735.


3. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 4. International Security 31:4 36 scribed as a political-military alliance that combines the key political function


of guiding members? foreign and security policy and providing a forum for alliance consultation with the operational function of ensuring that members


can train and develop the capabilities to cooperate militarily.4 This dual role


helps to explain why NATO has endured.5 The key issues are whether its


members continue to agree on its value and what its core tasks should be, as


well as the threat that it confronts. Moreover, if NATO?s members do not seek


to address their core security threats within the alliance, the alliance?s military


value to its members is likely to be questioned.


In the next section, I compare U.S. and NATO strategies for confronting terrorism. I then assess NATO?s contribution to the U.S. ªght against terrorism.


The following section examines factors that help to explain why NATO?s contribution to the U.S. war on terror has been relatively limited. I look at three elements: systemic changes and their consequences for NATO, alliance


capabilities, and the nature of the ªght against terrorism. Finally, I discuss the


implications of NATO?s elusive role in combating terrorism for U.S. policy and


for the alliance. Comparing Strategies for Confronting Terrorism


The U.S. government widely regards NATO as the most important institution


that the United States works with, its premier alliance. Not only do government ofªcials point out how much the alliance has done to support U.S. activi4. Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane propose that NATO has become a security management institution rather than an alliance. See Wallander and Keohane, ?Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions,? in Helga Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security


Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 21?47.


5. Relatively little theoretical research has examined NATO?s current situation. Some recent exceptions include evaluations of the alliance?s effort to adjust to shifting power relations, and of soft


balancing as an alternative to traditional balance of power behavior. See Galia Press-Barnathan,


?Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity,? Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April?June


2006), pp. 271?309; Seyom Brown, Multilateral Constraints on the Use of Force: A Reassessment


(Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006); Robert A. Pape, ?Soft Balancing against the United States,? International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 7?45;


T.V. Paul, ?Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,? International Security, Vol. 30. No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 46?71; and Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, ?Hard Times for Soft Balancing,? International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 72?108. For discussions of alliance


persistence and maintenance, see Stephen M. Walt, ?Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,? Survival,


Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 156?179; Patricia A. Weitsman, ?Intimate Enemies: The Politics of


Peacetime Alliances,? Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 156?192; and Barry Buzan


and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge


University Press, 2003). NATO?s International Security Role 37 ties against terrorists, but they also note that virtually all of NATO?s activities


today are shaped by the struggle against terrorism.6


Terrorism had emerged as a shared alliance concern by the late 1990s. Terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 led


the United States to urge NATO to address this threat more seriously. As a result, terrorism was incorporated as a factor contributing to NATO?s security


challenges in the alliance?s 1999 Strategic Concept.7 It was not, however, a core


focus of NATO policy at that time.8 Terrorism crystallized as a central threat to


alliance members only after the September 11 attacks on the United States.


NATO?s initial response to these attacks was twofold: within twenty-four


hours, it invoked article 5 of its charter, declaring that the attacks on the United


States represented an attack on all alliance members. It followed this in subsequent weeks with agreement on steps to assist the U.S.-led coalition that attacked al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001. These steps


included increasing intelligence cooperation, helping to defend states that


were participating in the Afghanistan campaign, allowing overºight rights,


and deploying naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean and NATO airborne


warning and control system (AWACS) planes to the United States.9 These actions set the precedent that the alliance?s article 5 commitment could stretch


beyond the territorial defense of member states to include defense against terrorist attacks.10


NATO also moved quickly to develop military guidelines for responding to


terrorism. At the November 2002 Prague summit, members endorsed the new


Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism as ofªcial NATO policy. The


political guidance for alliance actions emphasizes that NATO?s goal should be


to ?help deter, defend, disrupt, and protect against terrorist attacks,? including


by acting against state sponsors of terrorists. In addition, the document iden6. U.S. ofªcial, interview by author, Brussels, Belgium, June 7, 2006.


7. To be sure, NATO?s European members have long experience with terrorism. For discussions of


European responses, see Jeremy Shapiro and Bénédicte Suzan, ?The French Experience of Counter-terrorism,? Survival, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 67?98; and Esther Brimmer, ed., Transforming Homeland Security: U.S. and European Approaches (Washington, D.C.: Center for


Transatlantic Relations, 2006).


8. NATO, ?The Alliance?s Strategic Concept,? NATO summit, Washington, D.C., April 24, 1999,






9. Several alliance members also participated in the coalition. NATO, ?Brieªng: Response to


Terrorism,? Online Library, March 2005, http:/






10. ?Transatlantic Homeland Defense,? CTNSP/INSS Special Report (Washington, D.C.: Center


for Technology and National Security Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, May 2006), http:/


/ International Security 31:4 38 tiªes four military roles for alliance operations against terrorism: antiterrorism,


or defensive measures; consequence management in the event of an attack


against a member state; offensive counterterrorism; and military cooperation


with nonmilitary forces.11


In some ways, U.S. strategies to combat terrorism differ from NATO strategies in the goals they emphasize. The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, published in September 2006, speciªes four short-term policies to


address terrorism: preventing terrorist attacks before they occur; denying


WMD to rogue states and terrorist groups; denying terrorist groups sanctuary


or support from rogue states; and preventing terrorist groups from controlling


any nation that they could use as a base of operations.12 The strategy seeks to


ensure that the United States confronts terrorism abroad, not at home. As the


U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of March 2006 notes, ?The ªght must be


taken to the enemy.?13 Moreover, in this rubric, prevention refers to offensive


counterterrorism activities. The goal of preventing attacks before they occur is


not only to stop a planned attack, but to hunt down and capture or kill terrorists determined to attack the United States. The denial elements of the strategy


are largely focused on states that might support terrorists.


NATO?s military guidelines are more defensive and reactive than those of


the United States. NATO places greater emphasis on reducing vulnerabilities


and enhancing capabilities to respond quickly to potential attacks. In contrast,


the United States seeks to keep terrorists from striking the homeland or U.S.


interests abroad. And, whereas NATO?s military guidelines suggest that its


forces could play either lead or supportive roles in offensive operations against


terrorists, more planning is recommended before NATO-led offensive operations are undertaken, while the recommendations for support missions are


more practical. This indicates the alliance?s greater comfort and experience


with its support role.


The goals of NATO and the United States as outlined in these strategies do


overlap in important ways. For example, each recognizes the usefulness of


multilateral actions and seeks to prevent attacks before they occur. In addition,


NATO?s counterterrorism strategy shares with U.S. policy the recognition that 11. NATO, International Military Staff, ?NATO?s Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism,?


updated April 14, 2005, http:/




12. The long-term policy goal is to advance democracy as a means to quell support for terrorism.


National Security Council, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: White


House, September 2006), pp. 11?17, http:/




13. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.:


White House, March 2006), p. 8, http:/


/ NATO?s International Security Role 39 preventing attacks may require offensive action against terrorists or states that


support them. As NATO?s Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism


states, ?Allied nations agree that terrorists should not be allowed to base, train,


plan, stage, and execute terrorist actions, and the threat may be severe enough


to justify acting against these terrorists and those who harbor them.?14


The overlap notwithstanding, U.S. strategy documents suggest that NATO?s


deeply institutionalized, consensus-based model is not the United States? preferred approach for multilateral cooperation in the war on terror. Moreover,


NATO appears to be less central to U.S. policy and planning. Both the 2002 and


2006 NSS documents promote the formation of coalitions, both within and outside NATO, to address a range of threats.15 More critically, the 2006 NSS makes


explicit the U.S. preference for a looser form of cooperation, citing as a model


the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an activity designed by the George


W. Bush administration to constrain the spread of WMD-related technology.


The 2006 NSS states as a goal ?[the] establish[ment of] results-oriented partnerships on the model of the PSI to meet new challenges and opportunities.


These partnerships emphasize international cooperation, not international


bureaucracy. They rely on voluntary adherence rather than binding treaties.


They are oriented towards action and results rather than legislation or rulemaking.?16 The 2006 NSS also states that ?existing international institutions


have a role to play, but in many cases coalitions of the willing may be able to


respond more quickly and creatively, at least in the short term.?17 Similarly, the


2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) highlights the distinction between


?static alliances versus dynamic partnerships? and the Pentagon?s preference


for the latter.18 Some Pentagon ofªcials insist that the apparent disdain for existing alliances is aimed not at NATO, but at bodies such as the Organization


for American States, which, for example, has resisted U.S. efforts to revise its


charter in an attempt to isolate Venezuela?s president, Hugo Chavez, to punish


his anti-U.S. stance. Although NATO?s European members are less concerned


now that the United States would use NATO as a ?toolbox? than they were immediately after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003,19 they may not be reassured


that the United States strongly supports the alliance.


14. NATO, ?NATO?s Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism.?


15. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.:


White House, September 2002), http:/




16. Bush, National Security Strategy (2006), p. 46.


17. Ibid., p. 48.


18. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 6, 2006), p. vii, http:/




19. I thank an anonymous reviewer for reinforcing this point. International Security 31:4 40 A central question for the United States and NATO is whether their aims


correspond to the nature of the terrorist threat. Both U.S. strategy and NATO?s


military concept initially focused on a particular type of terrorism: the threat


posed by al-Qaida at the time of the September 11 attacks. The threat has


evolved since then, partly in response to U.S. and allied efforts to disrupt terrorist groups and their activities. The 2006 NSS notes the changed nature of the


threat, although the framework of U.S. policy has not changed. For example,


whether terrorists need states to support their activities is no longer clear.20


Not only have individuals proven willing to fund terrorist actions, but increasingly, terrorists operate ?virtually,? without formal ties, communicating and


even training via websites and other electronic media.21 One result has been


the ?localization? of threats, as seen in the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004


and London in 2005. These attacks were carried out by homegrown terrorists


with no clear ties to al-Qaida.


NATO and U.S. strategies thus exhibit both similarities and differences in


priorities. The crucial issue is how these strategies affect cooperation between


the United States and NATO regarding terrorism. NATO?s Role in the U.S. War on Terror


In this section I assess NATO?s contribution to the U.S. war on terror in the following categories: (1) prevention and defense, (2) denial, (3) counterterrorism,


and (4) consequence management?all of which are essential to confronting


terrorism. These categories incorporate both elements of the U.S. strategy and


NATO?s political and military efforts to ªght terrorism. For each category, I


evaluate how NATO?s efforts correspond to U.S. goals, as well as to the nature


of the terrorist threat.


prevention and defense against terrorist attacks


Efforts to prevent and defend against terrorist actions fall into two main areas:


intelligence sharing and surveillance to detect preparations for an attack.


NATO has engaged in both activities, primarily through Operation Active Endeavor (OAE). It is also exploring new technologies to detect and defend


against terrorist attacks, a third preventive activity.


20. See, for example, Fareed Zakaria, ?Terrorists Don?t Need States,? Newsweek, April 5, 2004,


p. 37.


21. See, among others, Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America?s Pursuit of Its


Enemies since 9/11 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006); and Benjamin Wallace-Wells, ?Private Jihad: How Rita Katz Got into the Spying Business,? New Yorker, May 29, 2006, pp. 28?41. NATO?s International Security Role 41 operation active endeavor. OAE is NATO?s only article 5 operation, and


it was the ªrst substantive military action the alliance took after the September


11 attacks to address the terrorist threat.22 This activity corresponds both to


Washington?s goal of preventing terrorist attacks and to NATO?s antiterrorism


strategy. After deploying in the eastern Mediterranean in October 2001 as a


deterrent and surveillance measure in support of the U.S. intervention in


Afghanistan, OAE evolved into a broader counterterrorism initiative. It expanded to cover the entire Mediterranean in 2003; and during the U.S.


invasion of Iraq, it escorted ships through the Strait of Gibraltar (at the


United States? request) to alleviate concerns that terrorists might target such


ships. OAE has focused on monitoring shipping and the safety of ports and


narrow sea-lanes. A second goal, particularly since 2003, has been to expand


participation by non-NATO states, both by countries that are formal NATO


partners and by countries participating in NATO?s Mediterranean Dialogue, a


consultative forum intended to improve cooperation with countries in the


Mediterranean area.23


OAE has devoted much attention to expanding its intelligence-sharing activities, including efforts to develop a network for tracking merchant shipping


throughout the Mediterranean, and improving means to share this intelligence


with relevant governments. This should help to address not only terrorist concerns but also alliance efforts to prevent drug smuggling and the spread of


weapons of mass destruction.24


OAE has clear military objectives, and NATO has developed valuable experience in maritime surveillance and interdiction through this mission. At the


same time, the mission has had both strategic and political aims. NATO has


sought to include Russia in OAE, for example, to gain Moscow?s agreement to


extend the operation?s activities into the Black Sea. Expansion into the Black


Sea has not happened, due to objections from both Russia and Turkey to allowing NATO operations there, but Russia participated in OAE patrols in the


Mediterranean in 2006.25 Efforts to include more Mediterranean countries are


22. General James L. Jones, ?NATO: From Common Defense to Common Security,? Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong., 2d sess., February 7, 2006, http:/






23. NATO, ?NATO Elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a Genuine Partnership, Launches Istanbul


Cooperation Initiative,? NATO Update, June 29, 2004, http:/






24. Robert Cesaretti, ?Combating Terrorism in the Mediterranean,? NATO Review, No. 3 (Autumn


2005), http:/




25. Russia was unwilling to agree to this move unless it gained a greater decisionmaking role over


the activity, which NATO was not willing to accept. Vladimir Socor, ?Russians Not Joining NATO


Operation Active Endeavor,? Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 1, No. 136 (November 30, 2004); Jones, International Security 31:4 42 designed to improve cooperation and, if possible, to share the burden for sustaining the operation with a greater number of countries. This is in keeping


with NATO?s ongoing efforts to explore expanded partnerships with countries


around the globe.26


The United States values OAE because it facilitates...


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